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Purpose: The purpose of this study is to identify how multinational companies 
set their central management control systems and how are these are 
perceived and implemented at a local level; and why any differences 
may exist in local adaptation/implementation. 
 
Methodology: This case study has followed a qualitative, hybrid deductive-inductive 
research strategy. the empirical data has been collected through 
interviews. The results were complemented with secondary data such 
as official websites, annual reports, and codes of ethics. 
 
Theoretical framework: The theoretical framework of this paper was comprised from theory 
concerning management control systems, national culture, local and 
international adaptation of MCS. 
 
Empirical foundation: The empirical perspective was derived from four interviews with four 
managers from two companies, company A and company B, in 
Greece and Sweden, and Mexico and Colombia respectively. 
Additional information was retrieved from the companies’ websites, 
annual reports, and codes of conduct. 
 
Conclusions: The findings of this thesis indicate that MCS within a multinational 
company tend to converge, rather than follow the parent company’s 
national culture.  They also suggest that local culture is not a 
significant factor in the local implementation of the centrally-set MCS. 
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1 Introduction 
 
“Culture. . . is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, 
law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of 
society” (Tylor, E., 1871). 
National cultures are different to one another in varying degrees, having developed within their 
own particular context, be it independently from one another, with reliance and cooperation 
with one another, or even as rivals or enemies of one another. Edward Tylor (1871) illustrates 
the complexity, uniqueness, and importance of culture in his definition above, aware that each 
country has developed its own independent attitudes, values, customs, and even languages from 
collective past experience.  These cultural differences extend to the modern workplace where 
they may now be more relevant than ever, affecting the means by which employees are best 
controlled, which is the concentration of this thesis. 
In today’s globalised world companies often have operations in many different countries, often 
doing so to seek resources, efficiencies, or markets (Tayeb, 1998); it is natural for the head 
offices of these organisations to desire standardisation of practices and to control the group by 
applying the same formula to all branches, indeed, a standardised MCS would be simpler and 
cheaper to design and apply. 
This thesis is a comparative study of management control systems (MCS) used within two 
multinational companies, specifically those used in two of each multinational in which it 
operates.  Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions framework is used for interpretation and 
analysis of this information in order to identify possible reasons for any differences in the MCS 
used in different locations. 
1.1 Background 
Since Hofstede (1980) developed his framework for cultural analysis, researchers have 
increasingly become aware of the influence that culture can have on the effectiveness of MCS. 
Hofstede (1980) suggested that the transfer of MCSs from one country to another may be 
ineffective because the MCS may conflict with cultural diversities. This is supported by Chow, 
Kato, and Merchant (1996), who urge that an efficient MCS may become dysfunctional if the 
cultural context changes.  Consequently, a company may not notice that its benchmarking 
efforts are misleading and do not accurately represent the performance capabilities of a 
subsidiary (Lere and Portz, 2005). 
In order to prevent this potentially damaging outcome, Lere and Portz (2005) advocate 
additional management training for cultural awareness. If a company's leaders understand that a 
once-functional control system cannot simply be copied to another location, but instead needs 
to be adapted and shaped to the cultural environment, then there is a higher likelihood that the 
control systems will be aligned with the company's strategy and objectives. This development of 
cultural awareness has already been observed with the emergence of hybrid management 
control systems (Tallaki and Bracci, 2015), whereby a business does not only utilise one MCS 
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throughout its organisation, but uses several MCS which are ideal for the location in which they 
are used. 
The benefit of such hybrid approaches has been argued by Frimousse, Swalhi, and Alaoui 
(2011), who found that the hybridisation of HRM practices led to a higher employee 
commitment, and in turn to a lower intention to resign. Therefore, a successful implementation 
of strategy through an MCS might not be as successful, or even successful at all, for a subsidiary 
which operates in a different cultural environment. 
Another method to examine this effect of culture is the use of the previously mentioned 
framework by Hofstede. For example, Zhang, Liang, and Sun (2013) applied the individualism 
versus collectivism (IC) dimension to analyse the cultural influence on corporate governance. 
They found that the IC dimension would affect the moral behaviour and judgement of 
employees which in turn shaped the corporate governance. Therefore, one can argue that if 
Hofstede's dimensions can form the type of corporate governance, the base of a corporation, 
then they also affect everything else within that company. In a similar manner, Pakdil and 
Leonard (2016) argue that an ideal culture for successful implementation of lean manufacturing 
is one with a societal emphasis on femininity, individualism, high uncertainty avoidance, and 
high-power distance. 
1.2 Problem 
MCS cannot be applied in a uniform manner to all circumstances, they are contingent on 
environmental factors such as national culture and the legal environment, indeed, contingency 
theory states that organisations are open systems which need to balance internal and external 
circumstances, and that while there is no formula for optimal organisation, it is instead up to 
management to find the best fit to the circumstances (Morgan, 1986).  It may be ineffective or 
even detrimental to implement MCS without considering culture and how employees will react 
to said MCS. 
“Multinational organisations are often characterised by a high degree of decentralised decision 
making . . . the geography dimension requires managers to be sensitive to each of the national 
cultures in which they operate” (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2003), this means that since 
decisions will be taken locally in the subsidiaries in various locations, they will be taken from 
the cultural perspective of that location. 
In order for a multinational company to implement strategy in an effective and efficient way, it 
is thus important that their MCS is functioning optimally in all locations within the group.  So, 
the impact, effects, and advantages of cultural differences should be considered and exploited. 
1.3 Purpose and Aim 
This paper aims to identify how MCS are set by the parent companies in two multinational 
organisations, and why they are set in any particular configuration, with a focus on national 
culture as an influence on the design process. 
The paper will also aim to address how these centrally-set MCS are implemented within 
subsidiaries of the two case companies, and whether any variation between them is due to 
national culture at a local level. 
We seek to represent the empirical data in an understandable manner, identify any correlations 
between dimensions of national culture and the emphasis placed on different aspects of an 
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MCS using both empirical data and extant literature, and make inductive suppositions which 
may explain the results. 
1.4 Research Questions 
The research questions can be split into two areas which will be addressed.  The first two are 
concerned with the central design of the MCS: 
 
• How are centrally-set MCS designed by the parent company in a multinational 
organisation? 
• Can the national culture of the home nation explain why the MCS are set in this way? 
 
The next two questions are concerned with the local use of MCS: 
• How is local implementation different between subsidiaries in different national 
cultures? (explained with Simons) 
• Why is local implementation of centrally-set MCS different? (explained with Hofstede) 
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2 Method and Design 
In this following chapter, the applied research method and design are presented.  Furthermore, 
the reason behind the decision to follow a qualitative case study design with a partly deductive 
and partly inductive approach is stated.  Therefore, empirical data has been primarily collected 
through open and semi-structured interviews and subjective information from the interviewees.  
Consequently, discussion about validity, reliability, and methodological limitations of this study 
are presented in subsections 2.2 and 6.2 respectively.  This section also covers the criteria for 
the selection of companies, respondents, as well as the collection of data and the analysis of the 
empirical data. 
In this study, we take a case study approach in looking at the operations of two multinational 
companies in two of their subsidiary countries, making a study of four countries in total.  We 
assess differences in the design and local application of their MCS, that is, for the multinational 
as a whole and for each individual country. 
The study takes a qualitative approach for various reasons, since we aim to understand the link 
between national culture and MCS.  The area of study concerns a dynamic and complex reality 
where aspects of culture and controls are not fixed or permanent as they would be in a 
quantitative study.  The method used is one with which we collected data through interviews 
and subjective information from the interviewees.  Data are reported primarily through 
language rather than statistics, and comparisons are based on subjective criteria.  There is 
minor use of basic statistics in order to provide a visual representation of the empirical results 
in the analysis in chapter five. 
This study takes a partially deductive and partially inductive approach.  A deductive approach 
is taken in the first part of the study in order to discover how MCS are used and applied at both 
a central and local level within each case company and they are categorised accordingly.  An 
inductive approach is then taken to address the questions of why the MCS may be used in the 
way that they are according to the national culture in each situation, and how this may be a key 
factor in the design and application of the MCS.  An inductive approach is appropriate for 
qualitative approach since it allows the “existence of multiple subjective perspectives and 
constructing knowledge rather than seeking to find it in reality” (Bryman and Bell, 2008). 
It is expected that national culture may have an effect on the MCS of each multinational, with 
the controls used being contingent on the location and national culture. Thus, the MCS may 
have a different emphasis depending on the branch/subsidiary location. 
Three frameworks were required in order to collect and analyse the data, and so we have 
adapted the following well-known frameworks for this study.  The frameworks are developed 
further in the theoretical chapter (chapter 3), they are: 
1. Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) extended framework for analysis on the design and use of 
MCS, which we used for the collection of data. 
2. Simons’ (1994) levers of control framework, which was used to categorise the collected 
data on the controls used. 
3. Hofstede’s (1984) cultural dimensions framework, which was used to analyse the use of 
controls and relate it to national culture.  Hofstede’s (1984) table of cultural 
measurements can also be found in Appendix 1. 
 
5 
 
Since the multinationals are likely to be aware of cultural differences between their subsidiary 
locations, they may use some mechanism which recognises this. 
2.1 Interviews 
We held four main interviews by Skype and telephone with a mid-level manager from each of 
the four case countries – Sweden, Greece, Mexico, and Colombia.  The managers in Sweden 
and Greece work for company ‘A’, and the managers from Mexico and Colombia work for 
company ‘B’.  After the main interviews, we discussed matters further and raised any additional 
questions by means of emails and telephone calls with the managers. 
The case companies were selected because, primarily, they are multinational companies which 
have operations in various locations with differing scores according to Hofstede’s (1984) 
cultural dimensions, thus allowing for ease of comparison.  Company ‘A’ has operations in 
both Greece and Sweden, whilst Company ‘B’ operates in Mexico and Colombia.  Since each 
company may be a special case which does not conform to a norm, two were selected to 
mitigate against this, and more would have been included in this study given greater time and 
resources. 
Respondents in the study are middle-managers who are involved in the implementation of the 
MCS at a local level, thus giving first-hand experience of how they are used or followed; but 
they are also at a high enough level in the organisations to understand the aims of the central 
administration in setting the MCS and the outcomes they hope for.  This level of manager was 
chosen in order to get a fuller picture of the MCS, as opposed to the view of either the 
implementation or setting departments in isolation. 
The main interviews we conducted were semi-structured and based on the Ferreira and Otley 
(2009) framework, which we adapted for our purposes.  This is discussed and developed in the 
theoretical chapter (chapter 3) below. Interviewees were asked the prepared questions from the 
Ferreira and Otley (2009) framework, but then given opportunity to expand on what they said, 
and the interviewers asked further questions that seemed relevant even though not in the 
framework. 
The purpose of the interviews was to collect quantitative data for analysis, identifying various 
aspects of the MCS in place, making use of what we see as relevant to the case.  We adapted 
our questions in order to ensure that a concentration on Simons’ (1994) levers of control is 
clear. 
We asked the interviewees to rate the level of use, or the local emphasis given, to each aspect 
of the MCS which they described, with the options of ‘none’, ‘low’, ‘medium, and ‘high’.  This 
rating allowed us to make comparisons between the extent to which each tool is used in each 
country, and how this might contrast to the central design of the MCS. 
The ratings provided by the respondents were assigned a number which was then used to 
create an index which could be used for comparison.  The concept of an index allows direct, 
ordinal, comparison as to whether a greater or lesser emphasis is given to any of the levers of 
control.  The rankings of low, medium, and high, were converted into a numerical format, as a 
Likert scale, from 0 for ‘not applicable’, 1 for ‘low’, 2 for ‘medium’, to 3 for ‘high’.  These 
numbers were then aggregated for each lever of control to give a mean value for both the 
central design and local application of each lever in each country. 
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The mean values for each country were converted into an index which can then be represented 
in graphical format, thus making comparison and analysis easier.  The data were converted into 
an index by multiplying the mean values by 100/3. 
Once the empirical findings were collected, tables of the emphasis ratings given by the 
respondents were created in a standardised format in order to allow for ease of comparability.  
Each lever of control was then analysed in turn and in an ordinal nature with reference to the 
index and tables which were created.  An inductive approach and rationale in the analysis 
section attempts to explain why certain levers may receive greater emphasis depending on the 
cultural dimensions of the location. 
2.2 Validity and Reliability 
Notwithstanding the limitations with regards to the present research design, several criteria were 
used to enhance the quality of the research.  Based on Bryman & Bell (2015) we can divide the 
evaluation of the validity and reliability of a qualitative study into four categories; credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability.  Bryman & Bell (2015) suggest that credibility 
refers to the internal validity, transferability refers to the external validity, dependability is 
extending equally with reliability, and confirmability with objectivity.  They also highlight that all 
four aspects ensure the trustworthiness of the qualitative study.  Based on the aforementioned, 
we conducted tests for all four evaluation criteria.  
Bryman & Bell (2015) suggest that credibility shields the study in order to be conducted 
appropriately and carried out according to good practice.  This has been ensured, in this case 
study, by allowing the respondents to double-check the material they provided us and to finalise 
their responses.  In addition, the comparability of the results drawn from the interviews 
enhances the internal validity of the study.  Furthermore, recording all interviews and by using 
direct quotes from these interviews establishes a chain of evidence as Yin (2014) suggests.  In 
that regard, we have taken both actions so that the reader can have a direct relation with the 
source of information and see with ease what the arguments are based on, so as to decide 
individually whether he agrees or not. 
Following, transferability has been referred to as the possibility of generalising the findings from 
Yin (2014) and Bryman & Bell (2015).  Case studies are generally criticised for not being 
generalisable because of their tendency to a smaller sample size.  Also, since we chose to have 
two case companies, the findings included some different and unique characteristics, such as 
company culture, which may not be similar to other companies in the same field.  As Mason 
(2002) and Yin (2014) maintain, the aim of generalisability in a case study is not statistical; 
rather it aims for analytic generalisation.  Instead of drawing conclusions about a population 
based on empirical data from a sample, analytic generalisability is more closely linked to the 
theoretical framework of the study.  An analytic generalisation is at a higher conceptual level 
than statistical generalisation, and may be based on either confirming, modifying, or rejecting 
the theoretical concepts, or on new concepts that arose upon the completion of the case study 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015; Mason, 2002; Yin, 2014). 
Dependability runs parallel to reliability, and it entails ensuring access to all records of all the 
phases within the research process.  As Yin (2014) suggests, reliability refers to whether the case 
study can be performed again by a different researcher and gain the same results.  In addition, 
to ensure the reliability of the study, researchers should act as auditors to assure the complete 
description of all the steps that were taken in the process (Bryman & Bell, 2015).  Considering 
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this, to prove reliability, documentation of the procedures is essential.  Hence our selected 
research approach and procedures have been presented throughout the research process.  We 
have also kept track of the interviews for two reasons.  Firstly, to make it possible for a future 
researcher to make an individual interpretation of the given answers, and secondly, to make it 
possible for us to listen to the recordings separately and ensure this way an interpretation 
convergence of the findings.  In this manner, as Yin (2014) suggests for the goal of reliability, 
decreasing the incidence of errors and biases was achieved. 
The last criterion is confirmability which refers to the extent that the study is objective.  We 
acknowledge that when conducting a qualitative case study, impeccable objectivity is impossible.  
This can be further linked to researchers having acted in good faith, and that personal values 
have not been overtly allowed to influence the results of the case study (Bryman & Bell, 2015).  
As Yin (2014) recommends, in order to be objective, we have used evidence from multiple 
sources.  Our additional sources consist of data from documents concerning the organisations, 
their websites, annual reports, and corporate responsibility reports which we used to 
complement the interviews. In this sense, we were able to crosscheck and verify the 
information obtained during the interviews. 
3 Theoretical Frameworks 
This chapter explores the main literature which is used in the study, developing the frameworks 
which are used, starting first with the categorisation of the MCS for which Simons’ (1994) levers 
of control is used, and then developing the Ferreira and Otley (2009) extended framework for 
analysis which will be used as a basis for the data collection.  Lastly, Hofstede’s (1984) cultural 
dimensions are explored and used in section five ‘Analysis’ as an analytical tool to make 
comparisons between the cultures in each of the countries studied.  All three frameworks used 
for the purposes of the current paper are presented and discussed separately below. 
3.1 Simons’ (1994) Levers of Control 
Simons’ levers of control comprise a framework where MCS’s usage is twofold. It aims to 
promote the creativity while at the same time restricts employees’ behaviour. He sets four 
different categories to segregate the controls; belief systems, boundary systems, diagnostic 
control systems, and interactive control systems. Both a controlling and an enabling role are 
encompassed in the above systems. It is stated that “Controlling use aims to mitigate problems 
of information asymmetry, whereas enabling use seeks to reduce uncertainty and improve 
decision-making” (Sprinkle 2003 in Mundy 2010).  
The LOC framework has been used to investigate how organisations exploit their MCS 
through the aforementioned controls in order to implement business strategies. It is argued that 
the power of the levers derives from their interdependence and from how they work in synergy 
to achieve balance and desirable outcomes for the company rather than the effect of their 
individual characteristics (Simons 1995). (Kruis et al., 2016) maintain that the levers generate 
positive and negative forces that produce a dynamic tension between innovation and strategic 
renewal, and effective, predictable achievement of targets set, which eventually assure long-term 
success. A good balance between the 4 levers is required to manage the tensions between 
profit, growth, risk and control in an organisation albeit Simons does not provide a clearly 
defined concept of what balance is, nor how balance is reflected in the control system (Kruis et 
al., 2016). The Simons levers of control have permeated in management control environment. 
Notwithstanding that its influence is not obvious, due to difficulties to document, its influence 
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over literature and its widespread usage in empirical studies as the main theoretical framework 
and/or as a means of interpretation of data is ubiquitous (Tessier and Otley ,2012, Sweeney et 
al., 2012). 
Both strengths and weaknesses have been identified in Simons’ LOC framework. The broad 
perspective the framework uses up on the control system by examining the range of the 
controls used and the way they are deployed by the companies as well as its focus on strategic 
issues and on its implications for the control system, form the framework’s strength (Ferreira, 
2002). That is because the correlation of specific uses to particular control mechanisms 
enhances our understanding of the design of the MCS. The manner controls are used, helps us 
perceive whether all four LOC are applied and in which extent. In other words, enables to 
assess the balance –or not- between positive and negative controls (Ferreira, 2002; Simons, 
1995). 
The framework, however, has also its critics. Bisbe et al. (2007); Ferreira and Otley (2009) and 
Tessier and Otley (2012) argue for the framework’s ambiguity. The former, with regards to 
individual constructs in the theory and the latter for the framework as an entity. Following, 
other researchers have criticised the LOC framework for being vague and ambiguous. 
Pointedly, Kruis et.al. (2016) with regards to the concept of balance, which is a central idea of 
the framework, argue for it to be an indeterminate notion. 
 
 
Fig. 1 – Simons’ (1994) Levers of control 
 
Following, Collier (2005) maintains that the LOC framework “does not give sufficient emphasis 
to socio-ideological controls”. This is linked with the observation that the framework is focused 
on the top management and that it finds it difficult to follow the variety of informal controls that 
exist in organisations, especially in small ones (Ferreira, 2002) or on the operation of controls 
at lower hierarchical levels. So, in cases those informal controls are of utmost importance this is 
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a problem to confront and consequently it is unlikely that the LOC framework can satisfactorily 
explain the control system as a whole. “The levers of control are best explored in a large 
organisation because smaller firms can alter patterns of behaviour through more informal 
means” (Simons, 1995). We can argue that in this paper we overcame this last weakness as our 
subject matter is multi-national companies thus there is less room for informal processes to be 
involved.  
Ferreira, Otley (2009) framework is a development of its predecessor Otley (1999) framework, 
which initially contained five questions before its evolvement in 2009. Consequently, both 
frameworks used in this paper (Simons’ LOC and Ferreira & Otley’s framework) share strategy 
as a common feature. Other features are also shared in these two frameworks, a case in point is 
target setting and rewards that are addressed by Otley independently, they are consolidated to 
Simons’ diagnostic control systems, while information flows are embedded in all LOC. 
(Aldónio Ferreira, David Otley 2009) 
Beliefs systems 
Belief systems are formal systems used by management to “define, communicate, and reinforce 
the basic values, purpose, and direction for the organisation” (Simons’, 1994). Simons states 
that the beliefs systems of a company are actualised and promulgated through formal 
documents as for instance credos, mission statements, and statements of purpose. He further 
maintains that the assessment of the core values is crucial to the design of the beliefs systems. 
Beliefs systems and interactive control systems create "positive and inspirational forces." 
Boundary systems and diagnostic control systems create "constraints and ensure compliance 
with orders" (Simons 1995).  
Belief systems’ deployment by organisations helps them with their purpose to align individuals’ 
goals to those of the organisation, by influencing peoples’ mindset and behaviour (McCarthy & 
Gordon, 2011). Mundy (2010) indicates the lack of uniformity in the sense of processes and 
ways of how these activities are implemented. A connection has been also established between 
the belief control systems and the firm culture. Heinicke et al. (2016) found in their paper that 
belief control systems have a positive correlation with a flexible corporate culture, in other 
words, that means that the emphasis placed on belief control systems comprises a significant 
control mechanism in organisations that promote a flexible culture. 
Boundary systems 
Boundary systems are formal systems used by management to institute explicit limits and rules 
within which people must comply and act. Boundary systems are declared usually in negative 
terms or as minimum standards and are generated through codes of conduct, strategic planning 
systems, and operating directives provided to business managers from the central management. 
Simons 1994 stresses that the evaluation of risks to be avoided affects the design of them. The 
main focus of the boundary systems is the caution on avoiding risks related to strategy based on 
a given market position, such as price and quality.  
Furthermore, they consist of business conduct boundaries and strategic boundaries. The 
former are based on legal constraints, the organisation's belief systems, and industry and 
professional standards. For instance, centralised multi-national companies define and impose 
uncompromising rules of conduct regarding several aspects of their processes, as training, 
quality, cleanliness that are in accordance with their belief system and chosen business strategy. 
In arduous times for the company and when the performance pressure is intense these conduct 
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boundaries may be needed. The latter are imposed when a lack of focus jeopardises wearing 
away resources. Common ways to serve this purpose are strategic planning and capital 
budgeting (Simons 1995, a review by Joyce M. Shelleman). 
Finally, as stated by Mundy (2010) “any MCS that sets out minimum standards or guidelines 
for behaviour can be used by managers as a boundary lever of control”. 
Diagnostic control systems 
Diagnostic control systems represent a third lever of control and are the formal systems useful 
to provide the necessary feedback, to monitor organisational outcomes and to make any 
amendments need if standards of performance diverge from the pre-set ones. They observe 
performance and make sure it is in compliance with the strategy and plan of the company, and 
if not, correct any deviations.  
Diagnostic control systems are concentrated only on results and common examples are budget 
and profit plans. Furthermore, they are characterised from high sovereignty for organisational 
members and allow top managers to keep track of exceptions. As mentioned above, original 
feedback systems can be business plans and budgets as they are deployed to keep track of goals 
or any deviation from them and make the amendments necessary, however, in cases of 
measures that are not accurately or entirely developed dysfunctional behaviour may be 
authored. For example, “using the measure of sales calls per day may lead salespeople to 
maximise total calls without regard for actual sales potential” (Simons 1995, a review by Joyce 
M. Shelleman). 
Simons (1994) also states that the evaluation of critical performance variables affects the design 
of diagnostic systems. 
Interactive control systems 
Interactive control systems are the fourth lever of control and it consists of “formal systems 
used by top managers to regularly and personally involve themselves in the decision activities of 
subordinates” (Simons, 1994). Simons (1994) also clarifies that frequent top management 
attention and interest can transform any diagnostic control system into interactive, by 
encouraging the managers to interact with their subordinates, listen to them in common 
debates, as well as including them in the decision-making. Focus on attention, dialogue and 
learning is what gained, and what the purpose is, to make a control system interactive. Simons 
(1994), maintains that the analysis of strategic uncertainties affects the design of interactive 
systems. 
The controlling and enabling role, to which we referred to in the very first part of this section, 
seem to be configured uniquely by the interactive lever of control that accomplishes and 
sustains a balance between these roles. Another unique characteristic and organisational 
capability of the particular lever is the impact it has on the other levers (Mundy, 2010). 
It is supported by Mundy (2010) that the purpose of interactive control systems is to criticise 
and question the in-process action plans, by creating a discourse between individuals with 
multidisciplinary backgrounds to contribute with their knowledge.  
There is no general consensus or restriction on what an interactive system of control is or 
should be. Any control that is deployed by the top managers and is used interactively to “direct 
attention and to guide the bottom-up emergence of strategy” (Simons, 1995) is essentially an 
interactive control. 
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As mentioned earlier with regards to the diagnostic control systems, they are focused only on 
results whereas the interactive controls “move beyond a focus on outcomes and open the black 
box that diagnostic controls keep shut” (Simons 1995).  
3.2 Ferreira and Otley (2009) Extended Framework for Analysis 
In order to collect the required information to be used in the Simons (1994) framework above, 
questions are needed which are able to collect all of the relevant information.  For this purpose 
the Ferreira and Otley (2009) framework has been chosen since it addresses our needs.  The 
whole framework will not be used, but selected questions which are most relevant to the study. 
The framework proposed by Ferreira and Otley (2009) puts forward“. . . a research tool for 
describing the structure and operation of PMSs in a more holistic manner”, whereby it aims to 
provide a template to aid in the description of key aspects of a company’s PMS.  This is done 
with a series of twelve questions which have been developed from earlier work by Otley (1999) 
and with the integration of some aspects of Simons (1994) levers of control, which is discussed 
above in section 3.1.  The authors state that an updated framework was required in order to 
provide a more comprehensive approach, since previous literature often had too narrow a 
focus for the whole picture to be considered. 
 
 
Fig. 2 – Ferreira and Otley (2009) Framework 
 
The framework identifies twelve key aspects of a PMS and aims to address each one so as to 
gain a broad picture of them for the PMS in use, the specific aspects can be seen in Ferreira 
and Otley’s (2009) diagram in fig 2 above.  As is demonstrated in the diagram, the whole PMS 
is framed within cultural and contextual factors, which are not investigated by the model. 
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This 2009 framework considers aspects of Simons’ (1994) levers of control, though tries to 
address the fact that some control mechanisms are part of more than one lever of control.  
Collier (2005) provides criticism that the framework relies heavily on diagnostic interactive 
controls, though Ferreira and Otley (2009) challenge this, saying that “. . . vision, mission, key 
success factors, strategies and plans, and organisation structure . . . are expected to be part of 
or, at the very least, influence belief systems, boundary systems or both”.  Thus, the belief 
systems and boundary systems levers are, indeed, incorporated into the questions. 
 
The diagnostic and interactive levers of control are addressed in questions 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the 
framework, namely the key performance measures, target setting, and performance evaluation 
aspects.  These questions address Simons’ (1994) critical performance variables from setting 
them to rewarding them, whilst strategic uncertainties are addressed particularly in PMS use, 
and the interactive nature of controls addressed in the target setting, evaluation, and reward 
questions. 
Stringer (2007) suggests that the interconnections made between the components of the PMS 
mean that the framework may only be applicable at the top level of management, though the 
authors say that this is too narrow an application of the framework since it serves to identify 
both components of and links between aspects of the PMS.  Indeed, they argue that “. . . the 
general nature of the framework enables other frameworks to be used to complement its 
interpretations and insights” (Ferreira and Otley, 2009) thus the framework is not hermetically 
closed and can be extended and used with others. 
Cultural and environmental considerations pervade the whole PMS, as indeed the authors 
state, they are a third level which they have left unexplored since “the factors involved are 
largely outside the control of the organisation” (Ferreira and Otley, 2009).The authors do, 
however, assert that the framework can be used to investigate the influence of culture on MCS 
when they state that “It is entirely appropriate to try to study the (contingent) relationship 
between external circumstances and PMSs design and use . . . we hope that it provides a 
valuable tool to be used in the conduct of research that seeks to examine the appropriate 
design of PMSs in different contexts”, being mindful that “. . . the framework is intended to act 
as a descriptive mechanism to capture the latter [design and use] variables only” (Ferreira and 
Otley, 2009). 
Ferreira and Otley (2009) integrate some aspects of Simons’ (1994) levers of control in order to 
provide an updated version of their framework, which was required in order to provide a more 
comprehensive approach since previous literature often had too narrow a focus for the whole 
picture to be considered.  The comprehensive approach allows the identification of factors 
which may not specifically come to mind when an interviewee is asked about a certain lever of 
control, and it provides more general information which may be used to explain more 
thoroughly the design and use of these levers in greater depth. 
Question one of the Ferreira and Otley (2009) framework concerns the vision and mission of 
the organisation, with the questions aimed at identifying not only what the vision and mission 
are, but also by which means these are communicated to the employees.  The vision and 
mission form part of Simons’ (1994) belief systems lever of control which are related to the 
core values of the organisation, and as such this question directly addresses an entire lever of 
control for the organisation. 
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Organisational structure is addressed in question two and helps to identify the design and 
combination of control mechanisms in order to implement the strategy of the organisation.  
Specifically, Ferreira and Otley (2009) state that “Organisation structure determines the 
responsibilities and accountabilities of organisational participants; it equally defines the activities 
that individuals with specific roles should not pay attention to”, and this allows the interviewer 
to achieve more depth in the interviews, discovering to whom certain controls correspond, and 
boundaries where employees should not be taking action or where they don’t have authority to 
act.  This question probes further than a direct question about the levers of control because it 
identifies areas which may not be considered as a lever of control, but actually are. 
Question three looks at the organisation’s “key performance measures deriving from its 
objectives” (Ferreira and Otley, 2009) and as such serves to identify the metrics or diagnostic 
control systems the organisation employs to achieve these, linking primarily to the diagnostic 
lever of control since these metrics will be the critical performance variables for the 
organisation, though links may also exist with both the interactive and boundary system levers. 
The fourth question is one on target setting, it enquires as to the targets that are set, how these 
are set, and how challenging they are for the employees or groups to meet.  In identifying the 
organisations’ targets in such detail it is possible to explore the diagnostic control systems and 
critical performance variables in greater depth than straight questions about those particular 
levers of control may.  The nature of the question also addresses how targets are set, and so 
could include an interactive aspect, relating to that respective lever of control. 
Performance evaluation is covered in question five, where the interviewee is asked how 
performance is assessed for individuals, groups, and the organisation.  The evaluation 
addressed in this question relates to the targets set in the previous question and show how the 
organisation identifies whether said targets have been reached.  This question makes it possible 
to identify whether the evaluation involves an interactive aspect which would relate to that lever 
of control.  The evaluation systems identified may make use of a mixture of diagnostic control 
systems, core values of the organisation, and risks to be avoided, thus covering all of the levers 
of control. 
The sixth question looks at reward systems, and is strongly linked to the performance 
evaluation in the previous question.  As Ferreira and Otley (2009) state, this question “. . . 
opens up the issue of the distinction between positive (i.e. rewarded) and negative (i.e. 
penalised) control activities, which were hinted at in Simons’ (1995) distinction between beliefs 
and boundary systems”.  Reward systems may make use of a mixture of diagnostic control 
systems, core values of the organisation, and risks to be avoided, thus, covering all of the levers 
of control. 
The specific questions which were used in the interviews are detailed in Appendix 2. 
3.3 National Culture and MCS 
There is a plethora of meanings and definitions of culture.  This plethora of definitions derives 
from its complex nature which makes it hard to be assessed and measured.  “Culture is found 
in all aspects of a society and can only be fully understood after extensive study” (Hofstede, 
1984).  Kaplan (1965) claims there is consensus among anthropologists that “culture is 
composed of patterned and interrelated traditions, which are transmitted over time and space 
by non-biological mechanisms based on men uniquely developed linguistic and non-linguistic 
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symbolising capabilities”.  Hofstede (1984) defines culture as the “collective programming of 
the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or society from those of another” (p. 
82). 
Furthermore, culture can be described by fundamental features such as knowledge, belief, art, 
morals, law, custom, and other capabilities and habits acquired by individuals as members of 
society (Seymour-Smith, 1986).  However, often culture is perceived to be a set of 
characteristics intending only to suit the methodological and scientific needs of the researchers.  
Hofstede (1984) gave culture a common structure by developing four primary dimensions, 
individualism/collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity/femininity.  
On this basis, it becomes less complicated to conceive a nation’s culture and the implications it 
holds for international management. 
Even though these cultural values provide us with consistent and important information about a 
country’s culture, they are only a glimpse of the complex system defining a nation.  Culture can 
only be fully understood when studied extensively (Hofstede, 1984).  In that sense managers 
engaging in international business should be cognizant of the cultural diversities and the varying 
cultural systems comprising a foreign country. 
Chenhall (2003) maintains that the relationship between the design of MCS and national 
culture represents an extension of contingency-based research from its organisational 
foundations into more sociological concerns.  What Chenhall (2003) argues is that different 
countries have specific cultural characteristics.  This attribute, consequently, makes it likely for 
individuals to respond in distinctive ways to MCS based on these unique characteristics.  Multi-
national operations and globalisation have popularised or even compelled the importance of 
culture in the design of MCS.  Companies with multi-national operations face the issue of 
whether to transfer their domestic MCS overseas, or design their systems from scratch to fit the 
cultural characteristics of the offshore entities (Chenhall, 2003). 
Contingency-based research in MCS has examined possible links between cultural dimensions 
and elements of structure such as standardisation, decentralisation, and control system 
characteristics such as formality on controls, reliance of accounting performance measures and 
budgetary participation.  The extant research has provided comingled results as to whether 
culture does have an effect on MCS design.  There has been little consensus on whether there 
is an association or not.  According to Chenhall (2003) this is because studies have examined 
different combinations of cultural dimensions and have considered aspects of MCS in different 
ways, ergo there is little convergence between studies to facilitate comparisons and develop 
generalisations. 
The four cultural value dimensions used in this paper, for analyses purposes, are 
individualism/collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity/femininity.  
Following in section (3.3.1) we present the aspects of each of the four dimensions and how the 
underlying cultural attributes affect employee and organisational behaviour. 
3.3.1 Hofstede, G. (1984) 
Individualism/Collectivism 
Kagitcibasi, (1987) proposed “individualism and collectivism constitute probably the most 
important dimension(s) of cultural differences in social behaviour” (p.76). Individualism and 
collectivism describes the degree of interdependence a society maintains among individuals 
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(Hofstede, 1984). It relates to the basic idea of “I” or “we”.  Hofstede (1984, p.83) maintained 
that individualism is a “loosely knit social framework in society wherein individuals are 
supposed to take care of themselves and their immediate families only” whereas collectivism is 
a “tightly knit social framework in which individuals can expect their in-group to look after 
them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty”.  What is most important in individualistic 
societies is the opposite to that of collectivistic societies.  The former favour personal 
performance along with the own responsibility and individual rights, ties between individuals 
and organisation are relatively loose and people primarily take care of themselves (Sliburyte, 
2005).  To the contrary, the latter prefer that individuals work in groups to reach certain goals.  
Decisions are made in consensus with the group and not on an individual basis (Sliburyte, 
2005).  On Hofstede’s scale, a low score suggests a collectivist society whilst an increasingly 
higher score is characteristic of individualistic tendencies.  Since this particular dimension has 
been considered as the most important, many researchers (Triandis 2004; Trompenaars & 
Woolliams, 2003; Triandis & Suh 2002; Bond, Leung, & Wan 1982; Gudykunst et al., 1992) 
have conducted studies in this respect.  The percentage of a country’s individuality influences 
the work values and consequently management theories and practices.  Motivational factors, 
rewards systems, and management techniques that individualistic societies and collectivistic 
ones react to, differ. Individualistic societies are focused on the individual while collectivistic 
societies, on the groups (Sliburyte, 2005).  Companies from opposite sides of the individualism 
scale that are involved in mutual business activities are highly probable to encounter different 
behaviour, which might affect communication and management.  Individualistic societies are 
motivated by self-interest and collectivistic societies by group interests (Hofstede, 1984).  This 
fundamental difference affects the way people are motivated and are successfully rewarded.  
Chiang (2005) maintains that rewards are comprehended in different manners across cultures, 
which in turn affects the extent of impetus resulting from certain rewards.  Considering the self 
and group interests, rewards based on individual performance and accomplishment are likely 
to attract workers from individualistic societies, whereas rewards based on the achievement of 
the group might appeal to collectivistic workers.  Gatley, Lessem, and Altman (1996) 
ascertained that in individualistic societies, policies and practices are supported by the 
promotion of individual achievement and promotion should be based on the individual’s 
accomplishments.  Conversely, in collectivistic environments, policies and practices are based 
on a sense of duty and loyalty, and promotion is done on ascriptive criteria (Gatley et al., 1996).  
It is substantial to be acquainted with these cultural differences when setting up a subsidiary in a 
foreign country and working with culturally diverse workers.  The way those relationships are 
shaped comprises a heterogeneity that strongly affects business relationships between 
individualistic and collectivistic societies.  In individualism, the task is most important and 
business partners should be treated alike (Hofstede, 1984).  Gatley et al. (1996) suggest that in 
individualistic societies universalist contractual transactions determine work and business 
activity.  Contrariwise, collectivists focus on relationships and trust (Hofstede, 1984).  When a 
company makes its entrance into a market with collectivistic culture much time is needed to be 
spent on establishing relationships and gaining the trust of significant business people.  The 
procedure of establishing a foreign subsidiary in a collectivistic society could therefore take 
longer than in an individualistic country.  Since relationships should be established from the 
first minute of the venture we can reach to another substantial difference between individualism 
and collectivism.  This is the present-giving act, which is often included in collectivist cultures, 
but on the other hand is often considered bribery in individualist societies and therefore not 
acceptable (Hofstede, 1984).  “Investing in personal relationships in most collectivist cultures 
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also involves the giving of presents and the rendering of services, practices which in an 
individualist culture would be considered as bribes” (Hofstede, 1984). 
Power distance 
Hofstede (1984) defines power distance as “the extent to which the members of a society 
accept that power in institutions and organisations is distributed unequally”.  Individuals in 
societies with larger power distance merely accept the hierarchical order and do not dispute 
their position within society.  They accept the fact that power is distributed unequally.  To the 
contrary people within small power distance societies question the allocation of power and 
attempt to counterpoise the power.  They do not accept their position in society but strive for 
more power (Hofstede, 1984).  On Hofstede’s scale, the higher the score the larger the power 
distance is within one country.  The divergence in power distance has an impact on the way 
employees interact and influences the employee-employer relationship.  It also influences 
management styles and the number of rules and employee responsibility.  Lower or higher 
power distance also modifies the degree of hierarchical order.  Divergence in power distance is 
perceptible in the organisational design and control.  When the degree of power distance is 
fairly large there is a strict separation between the power and responsibility of superiors and 
subordinates (Sliburyte, 2005).  “The fundamental issue addressed by this dimension is how a 
society handles inequalities among people when they occur” Hofstede (1984).  
Uncertainty avoidance 
Hofstede (1984) defines uncertainty avoidance as “the degree to which the members of a 
society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity”.  High uncertainty avoidance 
societies are very distressed with uncertainty.  They maintain strict behaviour and codes of 
belief and have no tolerance towards persons and ideas that diverge from those norms 
(Hofstede, 1984).  As Sliburyte (2005) suggests, high uncertainty avoidance leads to a high need 
for formal regulations and rules as individuals want to be in control.  In low uncertainty 
avoidance societies, the atmosphere is more relaxed (Hofstede, 1984) and “deviance is more 
easily tolerated”.  Flexibility is more important than principles and control (Hofstede, 1984).  
On Hofstede’s scale, a low score suggests low uncertainty avoidance and a high score is 
indicative of high uncertainty avoidance.  Hofstede (1991) maintained that “people in such 
cultures look for a structure in their organisations, institutions, and relationships which makes 
events clearly interpretable and predictable” (p. 116).  Like Power Distance, discussed above, 
uncertainty avoidance affects the way individuals build their institutions and organisations. 
Masculinity/Femininity 
Albaum (2003) defined Masculinity/femininity as the extent to which differences between men 
and women are used in a society to define roles for the genders.  Hofstede (1984) maintained 
that masculine societies are characterised by assertiveness, achievement, heroism, ambition, 
and material success.  In masculinity, the quantity of things is valued most.  And Sliburyte 
(2005) suggested that in masculine societies individuals desire to be recognised for their 
performance and to gain increased earnings.  Feminine societies, on the other hand, value 
relationships, caring for the weak, modesty, and quality of life (Hofstede, 1984).  Fulfilling 
social needs is valued more than personal accomplishment according to Sliburyte (2005).  On 
Hofstede’s scale, a larger score is indicative of a masculine society while a lower score shows 
the society has feminine tendencies.   
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Motivation differs in masculine and feminine societies, two main factors related to motivation 
comprise the difference.  In masculine societies individuals are motivated by achievement and 
in feminine societies by relationships (Hofstede, 1984).  According to Gatley et al. (1996) 
achievement motivation is expressed in masculine attributes of competition and individual 
decisions while wealth and recognition are the desired results of hard work and achievement.  
Gatley et al. (1996) also suggested that the main focus in feminine environments – where 
achievement motivation is low – is relationships and group integration.  Differences in 
motivation and reward practices should be taken into consideration from the international 
management teams when entering new markets.  For instance, in masculine societies it might 
be more compelling to reward based on individual performance while monetary rewards and 
promotion would probably be preferred.  On the other side of the scale, in femininity 
conditions, rewards based on group accomplishments, social integration, additional time off 
and flexible work schedules might be more suitable.  The first step, thus, to create a work 
environment that is valued by both cultures is taking those differences into account (Fening, F., 
Beyer, H., 2014).  “Like the Individualism-Collectivism dimension, the Masculinity–Femininity 
dimension relates to people's self-concept: who am I and what is my task in life?” (Hofstede, 
1984). 
The above section has addressed the four cultural value dimensions as identified by Hofstede 
and the implications they encapsulate for international management.  Furthermore the 
apparent importance culture plays for the management of foreign subsidiaries is shown.  
Culture naturally affects management in the headquarters of the company as well, but it is often 
not confronted as an influential factor since its MCS are initially tailored centrally to fit the 
home country first.  Entering and cooperating with markets with varying cultural conditions 
makes these differences obvious.  According to Hofstede (1984) “to operate successfully in a 
foreign country requires the identification of the cultural attributes and the determination of 
how it will affect the company’s operation”.  
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4 Empirical Findings 
The case companies which are studied are, company A, which is a Swedish-based, and long-
established (over 100 years), multinational company with its headquarters in Sweden.  The 
company is active in over 30 different countries, and operates in the manufacturing and 
engineering sector.  The second case company is company B, which is a Mexican-based 
multinational company, established in the 1980s, with its headquarters in Mexico.  The 
company is active in five Latin-American countries, and operates in the personal assistance 
sector. 
In this section we present the information which was obtained through the interviews.  Four 
main interviews were held, one with each manager in each subsidiary location, follow up 
questions were later either sent to the interviewees, or we were able to hold shorter clarification 
interviews by telephone. 
The MCS used in each scenario are explained in the text, with the key elements arranged into a 
standardised table for ease of direct comparison of the MCSs and their application in their 
local settings.  The information is also categorised into Simons’ (1995) levers of control, as can 
be seen in the tables, which further aids the analysis in chapter 5, enabling like-for-like 
comparison. 
The interviewees were also asked to provide a ranking – none, low, medium, and high – of how 
they perceived the central emphasis or level of importance that is placed on each aspect of the 
MCS; and they were also asked to provide a ranking for the local emphasis or use of each 
element of the MCS, which aims to show how important each aspect is from both the 
perspective of central management, and from the local perspective of the subsidiary. 
The information provided in the interviews is summarised in the tables in each subsection, 
whilst further details are in the running text.  The tables contain each interviewee’s responses to 
the ranking questions for both the central and local emphasis placed on each MCS aspect. 
4.1 Company ‘A’ 
Company A is a Swedish-based, and long-established (over 100 years), multinational company 
with its headquarters in Sweden.  The company is active in over 30 different countries, and 
operates in the manufacturing and engineering sector.   
4.1.1 Greece 
In our interviews and follow-up questions with an operations manager in Greece we were able 
to identify the most important aspects of the company’s MCS, both those set centrally, and 
actual local practise. 
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Fig. 3 – Company A data, Greece 
Belief Systems 
The same belief systems are in place within all subsidiaries of company A, these systems are set 
centrally, though there is some variation in their local application, as can be demonstrated in 
the Greek case.  In our interviews with an operations manager in the Greek subsidiary we 
found that the central organisation of the company places a high emphasis on the primary 
belief systems, those being the vision, mission, and drivers and values. 
The vision relates to the products produced by the company, and whilst this is an important 
belief lever for the company as a whole, which appears in all annual reports emitted by the 
parent company, the attention given to this lever of control is minimal.  The vision is not 
communicated to the employees very strongly in Greece, save for official communication from 
the parent company. 
The company mission is to be the undisputed leader in their field, and this mission has a high 
emphasis in the group’s strategy and documents produced by the parent company such as the 
annual report.  The mission is, again, not communicated intensely throughout the Greek 
subsidiary, but is informally disseminated throughout the subsidiary. As the interviewee said:  
“there is a general attitude that we are a global leader”. 
Drivers and values of the group are identified in their annual reports as “empowerment, high 
ethics, openness, teamwork”.  The drivers and values are known amongst employees in the 
subsidiary and are, indeed, followed, but not explicitly or consciously, as the interviewee stated: 
“Of course we hold these values, but I think that teamwork is most important of 
these in my day-to-day activities”. 
Boundary systems 
Company A has centrally set a code of conduct that seems to be important for the company 
and all its direct co-operators. The significance of the code is explicitly stated along with the 
need for all directly involved parties, to comply with the rules set in the code. The code of 
conduct puts in place the boundary systems of the organisation. 
 According to the code all members of the company must comply with the rules and act 
accordingly, while there is no such a circumstance that an individual or a situation can be 
characterised an exception. Top management is in charge of supervising the compliance and 
Lever of Control MCS Aspect Central Emphasis Local Emphasis
Vision Low Low
Mission High Medium
Drivers and values Medium Medium
Code of Conduct High High
Zero accidents Medium High
Financial KPIs High High
Non-financial KPIs Medium Medium
Incentives/rewards High High
Financial KPIs High High
Employee reviews High High
Budgets High Medium
Company A - Greece
Diagnostic Control System
Interactive Control System
Belief System
Boundary System
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make sure no divergence whatsoever takes place within the boundary system as well as take the 
respective measures in case of unlawful actions.  
Drawing from the code of conduct itself, a high emphasis seems to be placed in this field as the 
code is stringent and strictly expressed, leaving not the slightest margin of declination. The risks 
addressed are bribery, corruption, conflict of interest and protection of information and 
facilitation payments among others. Avoiding gift transactions with public servants and bodies is 
stressed, apart from when a situation demands it, but even then, the amount spent should not 
exceed the local customs. 
The manager in the Greek subsidiary stated that the code of ethics was not communicated that 
intensively in the Greek subsidiary but he stressed that it has become increasingly important 
over the last two to three years. He stated how elated he is with the obligatory and intensive 
code of conduct trainings that have been in place the last years. He believes it was something 
necessary for the corrupted nature prevalent in many aspects of the legal environment and 
processes in Greece. 
“We all knew it existed and had to sign up for it several years ago, but not until now 
have we been made to actually read it and get the appropriate education on it” 
With regards to the strategic planning the interviewee said that it all comes from the 
headquarters in Sweden and there is no room for discussion. So the strategic plan is set 
centrally from the company and they are not allowed to deviate from it at all. What can be 
subject to differentiation is the target setting which will be discussed in a following section. 
Diagnostic control systems 
Company A used to make use of budgeting and profit measures to follow the performance of 
its subsidiaries. Budgeting was left aside the last two to three years as it was a very time-intensive 
process usually taking place in mid-August to mid-September. As stated form the interviewee:   
“The company has streamlined the process by asking for a minimum flat sales 
increase, giving free space - accompanied by the respective accountability of course- 
to country managers of how this will be achieved” 
This shift to strategy as well as the loyalty and assiduity to the code of conduct – mentioned in 
the previous section- occurred due to the new CEO of the company. 
 
 Nonetheless not many KPIs are communicated to the employees. The interviewee stated that 
the input is limited to the higher group management and it is only them who have information 
on the exact KPIs and their task is to make sure their subordinates reach the targets set: 
“The employees are not familiar with the KPI’s but they do know the monthly 
targets, I don’t believe it is essential for them to know such details, since they only 
have to follow the orders to achieve the company’s targets” 
Following, the interviewee spoke about the review process in the company which is followed by 
an incentive and reward system. Employee 360 reviews are in place to keep track of the 
employees’ performance and efficiency. Employee evaluation is taking place twice a year and is 
based on soft (more subjective criteria) and hard (measurable indices) skills. Employees who 
get valued high in both categories, are rewarded after the salary review procedure (once a year), 
and can get a raise or even a promotion if they are eligible for it.  
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He stated that there is a climate of goodwill and growth and the employees are given equal 
opportunities to develop their skills and competence in order to reach their full potential, while 
the bargain is that they shall continue working towards the firm’s goals under its values and 
drivers. 
There is a difference between the above mentioned soft and hard skills when it comes to 
reward. Soft skills are rewarded with trainings and professionally oriented fairs aiming to 
personal and/or professional amelioration while high score in both categories comes hand in 
hand with financial rewards i.e. bonuses or a salary rise.  
Failure to achieve targets or deviation from budgets is not punished in any way. Instead, 
discourse sessions and meetings are in place to examine what the management was expecting, 
what actually happened and the reasons behind the malfunction. Through this constructive 
procedure, which demonstrates the existence of the interactive lever of control, the 
amendments to be made are discussed.  
The interviewee also maintained, that the failure to reach a target, results the bonus not to be 
distributed but in case an employee was to get a raise, they still get it but depleted. Α handling 
like this, shows that the company “punishes” the employees while at the same time has the 
intention to incentivise them by rewarding them and keeping them motivated. 
Interactive control systems 
As mentioned earlier the financial KPIs and the strategy for the group are set centrally and 
there is no room for interposition from the subsidiaries. However, under circumstances such as 
divergence from budgets or targets, discuss is mandatory between the local managers and the 
owner-managers in order to come up with a sustainable solution for the subsidiary.  
As the interviewee stated, there is plenty of interaction in this control method as the 
subsidiaries are able to set the targets according to local market circumstances. The interviewee 
stressed that there is the flexibility (from local managers) to prioritise the targets and set them to 
fit the market demands, of course, after discussion and abiding communication with the 
directors of the parent company that result to amendments in scheduling and action planning: 
“In Sweden there is high activity in the paper industry. So they develop projects and 
working towards innovation in this field, whereas in Greece there is no interest 
whatsoever in this sector so setting targets and strategic plans in this direction is a 
waste of time and resources” 
 Strategy, however, as mentioned before, is not subject to change despite the ease of target 
modification depending on market allowance. This can be accorded to the strict, top-down 
hierarchy nature of the organisation. 
Additionally, and with regards to the budgets, he declared that the parent company sets them 
according to the needs of the Greek subsidiary, hereto, but they are open to discussion. The 
manager of the Greek subsidiary stated that when necessary for the purposes of the subsidiary 
(and by extension for the firm in general), the parent will allocate more resources to the 
subsidiary to achieve the targets set. 
“The company provides us with all necessary resources upon request and after 
discussion. They often approve extra reasonable and relative financial and/or non-
financial aid, in order for us to achieve the targets set” 
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Expected deadlines are another issue the interviewee characterised as relatively flexible. He 
stated: 
“They never force us in this respect; there is neither reward nor penalty if you fail to 
meet a deadline. All this, within a reasonable timeframe of course”  
Finally, as addressed to a previous section -diagnostic control systems- the employee reviews 
apart from being a means of evaluation can be useful a technique for creating constructive 
discourse on important issues for the company’s prosperity. Employees’ performance is 
assessed twice a year. The evaluation is conducted based on relevant KPIs both financial (hard 
skills) and non-financial (soft skills).  
These reviews appertain to both diagnostic and interactive LOC. In the former as a result 
based, evaluation tool, and in the latter as a way of creating a dialogue between the employees 
and the management and giving the opportunity to the managers make changes to improve 
efficiency and performance. 
Targets are also a subject of discourse between senior managers and subordinates. As the 
interviewee stated: 
“It is obligatory to discuss in this respect; we use an interface in intranet. It officially 
takes place twice a year, but practically it is done more often, maybe 5-6 times per 
year” 
4.1.2 Sweden 
 
Fig. 4 – Company A data, Sweden 
Belief Systems 
With the belief systems set centrally by the parent company in Sweden, the same medium 
emphasis in the Swedish subsidiary was, if anything, expected. The interviewee confirmed the 
same level of importance. Consequently, it is obvious a difference to the local application of the 
belief systems control. 
Despite both subsidiaries placing a high emphasis on the primary belief systems, the Swedish 
subsidiary seems to place a higher emphasis on the vision compared to its counterpart in 
Greece. 
The attention given to this lever of control is high.  The vision is disseminated to the employees 
stronger in Sweden, whereas the mission remains in the same level of communication intensity 
in both companies. 
Lever of Control MCS Aspect Central Emphasis Local Emphasis
Vision Medium Medium
Mission Medium Medium
Drivers and values Medium High
Code of Conduct High Medium
Zero accidents High High
Financial KPIs High Medium
Non-financial KPIs High High
Incentives/rewards Medium High
Financial KPIs Medium High
Employee reviews High High
Budgets Medium Medium
Company A - Sweden
Diagnostic Control System
Interactive Control System
Belief System
Boundary System
23 
 
Drivers and values are identified to be identical for both companies. The distinguishing 
difference, however, is the degree of communication of these drivers and values. The 
interviewee B maintains that employees in the Swedish subsidiary are familiar with the drivers 
and values so they consciously work towards the targets achievement.  
Boundary systems 
The code of conduct is set centrally by the group and it is important for the Swedish subsidiary 
ditto, as reinforced by the interviewee, for it puts in place the boundary systems of the 
organisation, and the acceptable behaviour.  
Top management is, like in the Greek subsidiary, the guardian and assuror of complying with 
the regulations and the code of conduct and considering of necessary measures in case of not 
aligning with it. 
The interviewee stated that the communication of the code of ethics is not that assertive in the 
Swedish subsidiary. Opposite to the first interviewee, the interviewee did not disclose any 
mandatory training on the code of ethics, fact that he attributes to the general attitude of the 
Swedish working environment. As he stated: 
“Our Code of conduct is applied thoroughly and it is important for all of us to 
adhere to, but it is not communicated intensively. I don’t know how to explain this, 
but I believe that the code of ethics is a mentality to us and it is expected from 
everyone, to be aware of”  
The interviewee stated that an important tool for risk avoidance is the policy according to 
which the goal of the organisation is zero workplace accidents. As he supported, the company 
follows all the requirements and complies with the local workplace regulations. 
Finally, strategic planning is treated in the same exact way as in the Greek subsidiary. The 
parent company in Sweden sets the strategy to be followed and the targets to be achieved.  
Diagnostic control systems 
Same as in the Greek subsidiary, the performance of the Swedish subsidiary is assessed by the 
parent company by the degree of devotion to the budgets and profit (mainly) and non profit-
based measures. 
Ability to meet or exceed the targets set by the parent company is a criterion for the employees’ 
evaluation and by extension for the directors in charge. 
 
KPIs, both financial and non-financial are evenly important for the Swedish subsidiary and they 
are disseminated to the employees. As opposed to company A the non-financial KPIs are 
taken into account more seriously. Consequently, the Swedish subsidiary has attached the same 
importance to the soft skills as to the hard skills. 
The employee review process place emphasis on the KPIs for which the employee is 
accountable for, and their direct manager’s view of performance and progress.  Good reviews 
can go hand in hand with a pay rise, promotion or a bonus which is dependent on the KPIs 
and is given to the manager of the department who distributes it evenly to his subordinates. 
Divergence from the budget or weakness to achieve a target demands discourse between the 
manager and the subordinates in order to detect any malfunctions in the process and put in 
place any amendments necessary that will ultimately lead to the desirable effect.   
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Interactive control systems 
Dialogue between the subsidiary director and the parent company is central to the process of 
defining the appropriate budget. The budget allocated to each subsidiary is prefixed from the 
headquarters and similar to the Greek subsidiary there is room for influencing the budget-
setting process. That is achieved, after discussion between the parties involved, in the case that 
certain local circumstances like market adaptation demand it. 
Contrariwise, strategy is not subject to modification and there is no saying from the subsidiary’s 
director. This is a fact that makes more apparent the strict, top-down hierarchy of the 
organisation, since there is no predisposition towards countries, but all subsidiaries are treated 
likewise. 
Furthermore, the employee reviews take the same structure as those in Greece. Employees are 
assessed twice a year and the evaluation is conducted based on financial and non-financial 
KPIs. 
Efficiency and effectiveness, as in high scores in the evaluation process, result to financial 
remuneration. 
In case those KPIs are not met, the employees have to report to their direct manager and 
through teamwork and discussion changes in process are set to eliminate flaws and improve 
efficiency and performance.  
4.2 Company ‘B’ 
Company B is a Mexican-based multinational company, established in the 1980s, with its 
headquarters in Mexico.  The company is active in five Latin-American countries, and operates 
in the personal assistance sector. 
4.2.1 Mexico 
In fig. 5 the empirical information received from the company B manager in Mexico is 
summarised into the standard table. 
 
Fig. 5 – Company B data, Mexico 
Belief Systems 
The belief systems in place within company B are set centrally by the parent company in 
Mexico, which gives a medium emphasis on them when they are disseminated to the 
subsidiaries. 
Lever of Control MCS Aspect Central Emphasis Local Emphasis
Vision Medium Medium
Mission Medium Low
Drivers and values Low Low
Code of Conduct High High
Zero accidents/safety Low Medium
Financial KPIs Medium Medium
Non-financial KPIs Low Low
Incentives/rewards Medium Medium
Financial KPIs High Medium
Employee reviews Medium Low
Budgets Medium High
Interactive Control System
Boundary System
Belief System
Diagnostic Control System
Company B - Mexico
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The company mission is to make life easier for customers, providing them with excellent 
services which are linked to the values of the company (Company website, 2017), this is given a 
medium emphasis when it comes from the central organisation.  Locally in Mexico the mission 
is communicated to the employees in a mainly indirect way, it can be seen printed on some 
office products such as mouse pads, and it is displayed on the wall in the lobby, but not much 
more effort is made to communicate it to employees or instil it into their belief systems, 
generally giving it a low emphasis at the local level.  It may be that the mission is not seen as 
relevant, since in our interview with a company B manager in Mexico they said of the mission 
and vision: 
“The mission is a bit flowery . . . I think the vision is more relevant day-to-day, it’s 
easier to tell the employees that we want to be the best”. 
Company B’s vision is to be the best company in its field in Latin America (Company website, 
2017), and this is also given a medium emphasis by the central organisation.  The subsidiary in 
Mexico can also be said to place a medium emphasis on the vision, with it being communicated 
slightly more than the mission at a local level and sometimes verbally by superiors, as indeed 
our interviewee said it is easier to communicate. 
The company sets out six values on its website, those being trustworthiness, honesty, 
innovation, loyalty, leadership, and responsibility (Company website, 2017).  These values are 
identified by the central organisation as important to the company but, again, the interviewee 
says that these are not usually communicated directly to employees. 
Boundary systems 
Company B’s code of ethics and conduct is important to the organisation and is given a high 
emphasis by central management when it is disseminated. 
The code of conduct addresses specific risks to be avoided and gives employees clear and 
detailed instructions on how to deal with ethical, legal, and strategic risks.  The risks identified 
include aspects such as competition, marketing and communication, bribery, corruption, 
conflict of interest and protection of information (Code of ethics and conduct, 2017). 
The interviewee stated that the local emphasis placed on the code of ethics and conduct is also 
high, with it seen as an important tool for risk avoidance: 
“It’s really relevant to the situation in Mexico, there are many who abuse the system 
and something should be in place to fight it” 
Under the code, employees are not allowed to receive valuable gifts, rules are set out for 
conflicts of interest, and protection of the company’s confidential information. 
Punishments for violating the code of ethics and conduct in Mexico can be strict, with the most 
serious violations resulting in immediate dismissal from the company. 
There is no policy which explicitly states that the goal of the organisation is zero workplace 
accidents, but the central management insist that local subsidiaries comply with local workplace 
regulations.  The Mexican subsidiary follows this requirement and complies with local 
workplace law. 
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Diagnostic control systems 
Central management primarily uses budgets and profit measures to track the performance of its 
subsidiaries, and evaluation of their performance is carried out by the owner-managers.  
Bonuses for subsidiary directors are dependent on adherence to budgets and improving 
measures such as gross profit. Any deviations from the subsidiaries’ budgets is investigated by 
the owner-managers who will take decisions on what actions to take, this crosses with interactive 
controls since there is also involvement from the subsidiary director who is involved in this 
process. 
Since the company states that taking responsibility for one’s actions is one of its core values 
(Code of Ethics and Conduct, 2017), there are non-financial KPIs relating to environmental 
matters such as recycling and energy use at the subsidiary and group level, though there are 
none at employee level. 
Company B does not communicate many KPIs to the employees, instead preferring only to 
emphasise what they see as the most important or most relevant.  An example would be the 
finance department in Mexico whose tasks include closing the books each month for their 
subsidiary and also for the whole group, in this case the only KPI used to measure the 
department’s performance is the number of days taken to close the month; any bonus 
members of the finance department receive depends heavily on this KPI. 
Our interviewee was not pleased with the employee review process because they are based on 
very few criteria and the rewards are not sufficient.  He said: 
“For many there is no space for growth, so motivation for growth within the 
organisation is kind of non-existent”. 
The rewards offered by the review process were not, in the interviewee’s opinion, sufficient to 
motivate employees to exert effort in self-improvement or to seek promotion. 
Interactive control systems 
Deviations from the subsidiaries’ KPIs such as failure to meet budgets results in a discourse 
between the owner-managers and the subsidiary director where solutions are sought.  The aim 
of this discourse is to discover any underlying reasons for the variation and for the organisation 
to learn how to address such matters.  The subsidiary directors and owner-managers work 
together in the preparation of subsidiary budgets, focusing attention and forcing dialogue as per 
Simons’ (1994) definition of the interactive lever of control. 
During the employee reviews, the employee is assessed by their direct manager on their 
performance during the year, with an objective focus on their relevant KPIs, which is usually 
limited to one or two indicators which may be either financial or non-financial.  There is also a 
subjective aspect to the reviews where the direct manager will discuss the employee’s general 
performance and how it meets their expectations.  The reviews are interactive to some degree 
since they may allow minor changes to be made to working processes in order to improve 
performance, but they are unlikely to affect the group’s strategy in any way. 
4.2.2 Colombia 
In fig. 6 the empirical information received from a company B manager in Colombia is 
summarised into the standard table. 
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Fig. 6 – Company B data, Colombia 
Belief Systems 
With the belief systems set centrally by the parent company in Mexico, the same, medium, 
emphasis is placed on them when they come from central management.  However, in the 
Colombian subsidiary the group mission is enhanced with another locally-specific mission, 
namely putting a greater emphasis on providing a ‘designated driver’ service to customers in 
order to avoid the risks of driving after drinking alcohol.  This mission was developed due to 
local market and legal conditions where the problem of drink-driving exists and fines are very 
large for offenders.  The local mission is not communicated on any branded material but is 
informally disseminated throughout the subsidiary. 
“We focus a lot on providing services to stop drink-driving, it has concordance with 
the group mission but is also relevant to our context” 
The group mission of making life easier for customers, providing them with excellent services 
which are linked to the values of the company (Company website, 2017), is communicated in 
Colombia using much the same indirect means as in Mexico, viz. through branded office 
stationery, posters on the wall in the office, and on the company website. 
The group vision and values are not strongly communicated to employees within the Colombia 
subsidiary, save for on some of the internal office stationery and posters.  
Boundary systems 
The interviewee stated that the local emphasis placed on the code of ethics and conduct is also 
high, with it seen as an important tool for risk avoidance: 
“It [code of conduct] gives clear rules which are easy to communicate to the 
employees and ensures they know what is unacceptable”. 
As in Mexico, the punishments in Colombia for violating the code of ethics and conduct can be 
strict, the most serious violations resulting in immediate dismissal from the company. 
As stated above, there is no explicit policy on zero workplace accidents, but the Colombian 
subsidiary must comply with local laws and workplace regulations. 
Diagnostic control systems 
The performance of the Colombian subsidiary is assessed by the owner-managers in Mexico 
using profit-based KPIs and adherence to budgets.  The director of the subsidiary is evaluated 
on his ability to meet or exceed these targets, and his bonus depends on these indicators, that 
Lever of Control MCS Aspect Central Emphasis Local Emphasis
Vision Medium Low
Mission Medium Medium
Drivers and values Medium Low
Code of Conduct High High
Zero accidents/safety Medium Medium
Financial KPIs High Medium
Non-financial KPIs Low Medium
Incentives/rewards Medium Medium
Financial KPIs High Medium
Employee reviews Low Low
Budgets High High
Interactive Control System
Boundary System
Belief System
Diagnostic Control System
Company B - Colombia
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is, increasing profit and reducing costs.  It is borne in mind when the assessment is done that 
the Colombian subsidiary has some different activities to others in the group, namely the large 
focus on the designated driver service, and so the review allows for expected variances due to 
the nature of the different activities involved in this business line. 
“What HQ really care about is the financial results, the environmental KPIs are 
more for show, or a nice-to-have thing”. 
The director of the subsidiary is not evaluated much on the non-financial environmental KPIs 
because the owner-managers are more concerned with profit levels, though they do factor in his 
evaluation.  Other employees in the subsidiary, however, have no KPIs related to 
environmental or sustainability matters. 
The KPIs that are communicated to employees are limited, and they are given very few per 
employee or department.  The finance department, for example, uses the same KPI as that in 
Mexico which is simply the number of days it takes to close the books for the month, the only 
variation is the time given since the Colombia office only need to close their own books and 
not those of the whole group. 
“For employees, we usually use the same KPIs as in Mexico [HQ], it’s pretty 
centralised so they give us the formula to use” 
The employee review process is both objective and subjective, with emphasis on the KPIs for 
which the employee is responsible, and their direct manager’s view of performance and 
progress.  A good review can lead to a pay rise, promotion; the bonus is dependent on the 
KPIs but is also assessed objectively in the review process. 
Interactive control systems 
The Colombian subsidiary’s budget is set through a process which involves dialogue between 
the owner-managers at HQ and the subsidiary director.  The director is able to influence the 
budget-setting process by arguing his case for certain local circumstances.  Through this process 
and ongoing discussion throughout the year, the director of the Colombian subsidiary is able to 
request resources or amend the revenue or cost expectations. 
“The discourse we have with head office sometimes results in a change in local 
strategy, like the specialisation we now have in the designated driver scheme which 
other subsidiaries don’t have”. 
It is through the interactive discussions between the subsidiary director and central 
management that the Colombian office was able to concentrate more resources on the 
designated driver strategy when the opportunity came about. 
The employee reviews take the same structure as those in Mexico, with both objective and 
subjective assessment done by the employee’s direct manager.  The objective focus is on the 
small number of KPIs that each employee has, and the subjective part is how the manager 
views their performance.  Employees provide feedback to their direct manager in these reviews 
as to why KPIs were exceeded or not met, and can result in a change in processes if the 
manager thinks it is an important enough matter. 
“The employees sometimes have good efficiency ideas which they will bring up if 
performance was below expectations.  If they are good, we will think about adopting 
the ideas”. 
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4.3 Summary of Empirical Data 
In order to make the qualitative empirical data more easily comparable we created a simple 
index which represents the data we collected regarding the local application of each aspect of 
each lever of control.  The index can then be represented graphically for the purposes of 
comparison.  The rankings of both central emphasis and of local application/use were taken 
separately in order divide the analysis in a logical manner.  The rankings of low, medium, and 
high were converted into a numerical format, in a similar style to a Likert scale, ranging from 0 
for ‘not applicable’, 1 for ‘low’, 2 for ‘medium’, to 3 for ‘high’.  This information for each 
individual aspect was then aggregated for each lever of control to give a mean value for both the 
central design and local application of each lever in each national culture, viz. country. 
The mean values for each country were converted into an index which can then be represented 
in graphical format, thus making comparison and analysis easier.  The data were converted into 
an index by multiplying the mean values by 100/3. 
 
Fig. 7 – Index of central design and application of levers of control by parent 
The resulting indices can be seen above in fig. 7 for the central design and emphasis placed on 
each lever, and below in fig. 8 for the local application. 
 
Fig. 8 – Index of local application of levers of control 
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5 Analysis 
5.1 Use of Hofstede’s (1980) Cultural Dimensions 
Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions are used in this section as an analytical tool to make 
comparisons between the cultures in each of the countries studied. 
As presented above in section 3.3.1, the four cultural dimensions used in this paper for analysis 
purposes are individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity; and they 
were developed by Hofstede in a study of IBM employees around the world aiming to show 
differences in certain aspects of the “collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the 
members of one human group from another” (Hofstede, 1984, Hofstede’s definition of culture 
p.82). 
The four cultural dimensions are shown below, in the chart in fig. 9, for the four national 
cultures included in the study.  This information is used to make comparative analyses of the 
subsidiary countries and the empirical data on their use of MCS which was identified above in 
chapter 4. 
As Van der Stede (2003) states, “the adoption of Hofstede's framework to discuss the impact of 
national culture on MCIS design is consistent with most prior studies in management control”, 
meaning that it is a widely accepted and appropriate tool for this analysis. 
 
 
Fig. 9 – Cultural dimensions of case countries (Hofstede, 1980) 
We can see from fig. 9 that there are good means for comparison, since the highest ratings of 
cultural aspects are split amongst the sample.  Sweden has the highest level of individualism, 
Greece has the highest level of uncertainty avoidance, and Mexico has the highest levels in both 
power distance and masculinity. 
5.2 Analysis 
Using the graphical representation of the cultural dimensions in fig. 9 above, the central design 
information in fig. 7, and the levers of control application table in fig. 8, we are able, to identify 
the most conspicuous differences in central design and local application of levers of control and 
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then systematically compare these differences with the cultural dimensions to test for 
correlations, whilst using extant literature to support or rebut inferences from the data where 
relevant.  Since there is limited literature available which makes direct comparisons between 
Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions and Simons’ (1994) levers of control, suppositions are 
made using any relevant literature where a reasonable link can be found, though the majority of 
analysis in the local application sections is data-comparative in nature. 
The majority of the comparisons made in this analysis of the empirical data are ordinal in 
nature, meaning that they concern the place or ranking of each measure, and not the size of the 
interval between them unless it is explicitly stated. 
All references to local application, local emphasis, and local use refer to the intensity of each 
lever of control in the subsidiary as a result of local decisions or attitudes to said levers. 
Before each subsection, both the indices for cultural dimensions and for the relevant lever of 
control are shown in order to make the analysis easier to follow for the reader. 
5.2.1 Central design of MCS 
The central design of the MCS concerns how the parent company sets the MCS to be used 
within the multinational group, that is whether the national culture of the home nation 
influences the central design.  Below in fig. 10 and fig. 7 the data for the parent countries of 
company A and company B are represented for the purposes of this analysis. 
The headquarters of company A are in Sweden, and the headquarters of company B are in 
Mexico, so the national culture of these two countries is shown below in fig. 10, and the 
empirical data regarding the central design is shown again in fig. 7 below. 
 
Fig. 10 – Cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980)  Fig. 7 – Local index for boundary system levers  
The lever which is given the highest emphasis in the central design of their MCS is the 
boundary system lever for company A in Sweden.  Sweden has the lowest power distance and 
uncertainty avoidance measures of the two parent companies, which would seem to run 
counter to the literature, since a higher power distance and higher uncertainty avoidance are 
expected to correlate with high boundary system use. As Merchant and Van der Stede (2003) 
argue “people who are high in power distance are likely to prefer, or at least more likely to 
accept, greater centralisation of decision authority and less participation in decision processes”, 
whilst a boundary system is one which provides highly centralised “limits and rules which must 
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be respected” (Simons, 1994).Furthermore, Kim and Kang (1991) assert that “uncertainty 
avoidance is correlated positively with bureaucratic control”, and they define bureaucratic 
controls as those with “the use of rules, regulations, policies, hierarchy of authority, and other 
bureaucratic mechanisms to standardise behaviour”. As such, it would be expected that the 
Mexican company B would design an MCS with a higher emphasis on boundary systems than 
Swedish company A, however this is not the case. 
Testing boundary systems against the individualism and masculinity dimensions, there seems to 
be little literature to suggest any correlations since a boundary affects both individuals and 
groups in the same way; and the boundaries or rules have little to do with the “achievement, 
heroism, assertiveness, and material success” identified by Hofstede (1984) as the values most 
associated with masculinity. 
The belief systems, as designed by the parent companies, are at a similar level [within 6 points] 
to one another.  Kim et al. (1991) define a clan control as one with “the use of organisational 
culture (encompassing values, commitment, traditions, and shared norms and beliefs) to 
control behaviour” and as such we can use ‘clan’ and ‘belief’ as almost interchangeable terms 
when they suggest that “a clan control system will work better in societies with small power 
distance than in societies with large power distance” (Kim et al., 1991).  This suggests that 
power distance should have a negative correlation with belief systems, which holds true when 
we observe that both company A and B conform to this in their MCS design, albeit very subtly. 
Investigating further, we consider that “A clan control system will work better in a collectivist 
society than in an individualistic society” (Kim and Kang, 1991), and that “Collectivism [the 
opposite of individualism], stands for a preference for a tightly knit social framework in which 
individuals can expect their relatives, clan, or other in-group to look after them in exchange for 
unquestioning loyalty” (Hofstede, 1984).  Given that a clan control is related to belief systems, 
we can infer that a belief system is likely to be more important or significant in a national 
culture with low individualism, thus a negative correlation.  This is not the case in the empirical 
data – the belief system aspect of the MCS designed in Sweden is higher than that of Mexico, 
whilst individualism is significantly higher in Sweden than in Mexico. 
Given that “A bureaucratic control system will work better in societies with large power distance 
than in societies with small power distance” (Kim and Kang, 1991), and that bureaucratic 
control systems make use of “rules, regulations, policies, hierarchy of authority, and other 
bureaucratic mechanisms to standardise behaviour”, this suggests that low power distance 
countries would design an MCS with a high level of diagnostic control.  This correlates with the 
empirical data, with the parent in Sweden having the smallest power distance and largest 
emphasis on diagnostic controls. 
In the empirical data, the Swedish parent company emphasises interactive controls throughout 
the organisation more than the Mexican parent does.  This agrees with the literature for 
Sweden where Hofstede (2001) defines the “Swedish style [as one where] . . .superiors [are] 
accessible . . . management facilitates and empowers.  Power is decentralised and managers 
count on the experience of their team members”, coinciding with the interactive lever of 
control as one whereby input is sought by management (Simons 1994). 
This central design is then used throughout the multinational groups, often without much 
variation, since “the parent company, with the intention of promoting a similar philosophy 
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within the group, tends to transfer its Management Control Systems (MCSs) to the foreign 
subsidiary” (Schneider, 2006). 
It is interesting to note that the MCS set in company A in Sweden all tend to have a uniform 
level (though belief systems are low), and a potential explanation for this is that “management 
accounting and control practices are likely to converge across nations, especially in firms that 
operate internationally” (e.g., Granlund and Lukka, 1998; Shields, 1998), suggesting that 
elements of design come from various cultures, where the central design is a mix of all of the 
most dominant factors.  It is also true that the Swedish company A is larger and has been 
established longer than company B, and so it has had more time for this convergence process 
to take place across more national cultures. 
From the above analysis, it can be postulated that the national culture of the home country of 
each multinational group is not a primary factor in setting the MCS for the group, though this is 
dependent on factors such as how long the company has been established and decisions senior 
management may make in the design of MCS.  In the cases investigated, the empirical data 
suggests that there is a negative correlation between power distance in the home country and 
diagnostic control systems; and another negative correlation between power distance and 
interactive control systems in central MCS design. 
5.2.2 Local Application of Boundary Systems 
 
 
Fig. 9 – Cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980)  Fig. 11 – Local index for boundary system levers  
The first observation we made from the empirical data is that the highest emphasis and use of 
all the levers of control is the boundary system in Greece.  In order to see why this is the case 
we look at Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions to see if any reasonable suppositions can be 
made by comparing the cultural dimensions to the empirical data, and using any other extant 
literature or theory to aid the interpretation of the data. 
The most noticeable aspect of the cultural dimensions for Greece is the high level of 
uncertainty avoidance, which is the highest of all the case countries, initially suggesting that 
there may be a link between high use of boundary systems and a high index level for 
uncertainty avoidance.  The level of uncertainty avoidance, however, is low in Sweden and 
relatively high in Mexico and Colombia, with no effect seen in the level of application of 
boundary systems, in fact, these three countries have the same level[83] in the application index 
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of empirical data, suggesting that the effect of uncertainty avoidance may not be very profound, 
or that it has a greater effect towards the extreme higher end of the uncertainty avoidance 
index. 
Investigating further to see if there is any correlation between uncertainty avoidance and 
boundary systems, we note that Hofstede (2001) states specifically of Greece that “. . . as in all 
high Uncertainty Avoidance societies, bureaucracy, laws and rules are very important to make 
the world a safer place to live in”, this reinforces the suggestion from the data that there is likely 
to be a positive correlation between the two, since the very nature of a boundary system is to 
“establish limits and rules which must be respected” (Simons, 1994). 
Comparing the individualism levels of each country we see that Sweden has the highest level of 
individualism, and Colombia has the lowest; the level of individualism for Greece is somewhat 
mid-range which is counterintuitive if boundary systems were to be dependent on 
individualism.  As such, we can presume from this data that individualism is unlikely to have a 
correlation with application of boundary systems. 
With regards to both the power distance and masculinity cultural dimensions, we see that these 
are both highest in Mexico and Colombia and lowest in Sweden, with Greece mid-range again.  
Since this is also counterintuitive if boundary systems were to be dependent on either power 
distance or masculinity, it is unlikely that there is a correlation.  Furthermore the fundamental 
issue with power distance is “how a society handles inequalities among people when they 
occur” (Hofstede, 1984), which doesn’t necessarily seem to bear much relevance to the limits 
and boundaries enforced by a boundary system; and since masculinity is concerned primarily 
with “achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material success” (Hofstede, 1984), we can 
make the inference that there is unlikely to be a correlation between power distance or 
masculinity and the application of boundary systems. 
With regards to boundary systems, we can make the postulation that there may be a positive 
correlation between local application of boundary systems and high levels of uncertainty 
avoidance. 
5.2.3 Local Application of Belief Systems 
 
 
Fig. 9 – Cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980)  Fig. 12 – Local index for belief system levers  
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Another observation from the empirical data is that Mexico and Colombia have the lowest 
application, or give the lowest emphasis to, the belief systems levers of control.  In order to 
discover why this may be the case we look at Hofstede’s (1980) dimensions and see that 
Mexico and Colombia also have the lowest levels if individualism of the case countries meaning 
that there is the possibility of a link.  Testing this further we can see that individualism is also 
higher in Greece, and higher still in Sweden, which corresponds to their respective use of the 
belief systems, with Greece making a slightly greater use of them, and Sweden making the 
highest use of belief systems.  This suggests there may be a positive correlation between 
individualism and belief system use. 
Looking at the power distance we see the reverse of the above case, where power distance is 
greatest in Mexico and Colombia, suggesting that a high power distance might correlate to low 
belief system use.  To test this we can compare Greece and Sweden, which have lower power 
distance scores than Mexico and Colombia, with Sweden having the lowest of all, which makes 
a negative correlation likely. 
The literature from Hofstede (1984) states that “people in Large Power Distance societies 
accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place which needs no further 
justification”, which can indicate that a belief system is not needed so much since rules are 
accepted without need to agree with or believe in them.  This can be supported with the 
empirical data from Colombia, where the manager from company B states of the code of 
conduct that “it gives clear rules which are easy to communicate to the employees and ensures 
they know what is unacceptable”, which can be contrasted to the vision and values which are 
not strongly communicated to the employees of the Colombia subsidiary, illustrating that the 
employees may prefer precise rules over a belief system. 
We can see that masculinity is the highest in Mexico and Colombia, which again might be 
indicative of a relation between the two.  Testing this we see that masculinity is lower in Greece, 
and the lowest in Sweden, whilst use of belief systems is higher in Greece and highest in 
Sweden, suggesting a negative correlation between masculinity and use/application of belief 
systems in the MCS. 
A further point to note regarding masculinity is that in Hofstede’s (1980) index it is at similar 
levels for Greece, Mexico, and Colombia with them all within a range of 12 points.  The 
application index from the empirical data also shows similar levels for belief system use 
amongst these countries, again within a range of 12 points.  The close relationship between 
these two indices suggests that a correlation between belief systems and masculinity is more 
likely. 
Given that uncertainty avoidance is higher in Greece and lower in Sweden, whilst use of belief 
systems is higher in both of these countries than in Mexico and Colombia would suggest that 
there is no correlation between the uncertainty avoidance measure and the extent to which 
belief systems are used. 
Analysis of the empirical data suggests there is no correlation between belief systems and 
uncertainty avoidance, however we can make three suppositions about the use of this lever, 
inferring that use of, or local emphasis on, belief systems may have: 
A positive correlation with individualism; a negative correlation with power distance; and a 
negative correlation with masculinity. 
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5.2.4 Local Application of Diagnostic Control Systems 
 
 
Fig. 9 – Cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980)  Fig. 13 – Local index for diagnostic levers  
As can be seen above, the local application/emphasis of diagnostic control systems is highest in 
both Greece and Sweden, with the lowest level in Mexico.  In order to identify possible 
influences for this we look first at the individualism levels, noting that they are higher in Greece 
and Sweden than they are in Mexico and Colombia, suggesting there may be a positive 
correlation between the two.  However, when a comparison is made for the individualism and 
diagnostic control levels between Mexico and Colombia we see that the correlation doesn’t 
hold true because Mexico has higher individualism but a lower emphasis on the diagnostic 
control system.  The empirical data in this case suggests that there is no correlation between 
individualism and use of diagnostic controls. 
Given that Mexico and Colombia both have higher power distance measures and lower 
diagnostic system measures than Greece and Sweden there may be a correlation.  We can test 
this further by comparing only Mexico and Colombia with one another, where Mexico has the 
higher measure for power distance of the two, and the lowest measure for use of diagnostic 
controls, which suggests that there may indeed be a negative correlation. 
Looking at the uncertainty avoidance measure for Greece we can see that it is the highest of all 
the case countries, whilst Sweden has the lowest measure of uncertainty avoidance.  Given that 
Greece and Sweden have exactly the same result for their use of diagnostic control system lever 
[89], we can suppose that there may not be a link between uncertainty avoidance and the 
diagnostic lever.  In looking at Mexico and Colombia there is also no clear link, since their 
levels of uncertainty avoidance are very similar to each other, as is the data for the lever.  It is 
thus not possible to draw any conclusions from this information. 
The masculinity measure is highest for Mexico and Colombia which, since the application of 
diagnostic controls is lowest in these countries, can suggest a negative correlation.  Indeed, the 
measure of masculinity is slightly higher in Mexico than in Colombia, with diagnostic control 
use lower in Mexico than in Colombia, as would be expected with a negative correlation.  
Whilst the masculinity measure in Sweden is a lot lower than that of Greece, both countries 
have the same level of diagnostic control use, which can suggest there is either no correlation or 
that the correlation is weak with either higher usage of the diagnostic lever or lower levels of 
masculinity. 
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It should be borne in mind that in the empirical data both Greece and Sweden represent 
subsidiaries of company A, which are already identified as having a highly centralised and 
standardised MCS.  The high standardisation of the company’s MCS may skew the results 
since the subsidiaries do not enjoy much freedom in setting their own controls, which may be 
the reason that the empirical data for the use of this lever is the same in both of these countries.  
If, however the MCS was designed from the parent country’s perspective, the correlation 
identified above may hold true. 
It can thus be postulated that both power distance and masculinity may have a negative 
correlation with diagnostic control systems. 
5.2.5 Local Application of Interactive Control Systems 
 
 
Fig. 9 – Cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980)  Fig. 14 – Local index for interactive levers  
In the case of local application of interactive control systems, we can see that the results are 
similar to those for the diagnostic control systems.  Greece and Sweden have the highest level 
of local application, both with the same result [89]; whereas the lowest level is in Mexico and 
Colombia who also have the same result as each other [67]. 
Looking at the individualism measures we see that Greece and Sweden both have higher levels 
of individualism than Mexico and Colombia, suggesting that a positive correlation may exist.  
Between Greece and Sweden, however, there is a difference of 36 points in the individualism 
index, and such a large difference makes it less likely that there is a correlation with application 
of interactive control systems because both countries have the same level of local application 
for interactive control systems.  There is also a difference in the individualism index of 17 
points between Mexico and Colombia which further illustrates this point. 
The power distance measures for Mexico and Colombia are higher than those of Greece and 
Sweden, whilst their use of interactive control systems is lower, suggesting that there may be a 
negative correlation between the two.  There are no differences between the local application 
between Greece and Sweden, or between Mexico and Colombia, though their power distance 
indices are different, suggesting that if there is a correlation, it is weak or affected by some other 
factors, such as the parent company effect. 
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Literature on power distance states that “people in small power distance societies strive for 
power equalisation and demand justification for power inequalities” (Hofstede, 1984).  This 
opens the possibility that the nature of an interactive control, where the “managers regularly 
and personally involve themselves in the decision activities of subordinates” (Simons, 1994), is 
to demonstrate and effect the ‘equalisation’ and ‘justification’ that a low power distance culture 
desires.  Since the parent for company A is Swedish, it is more likely that this mindset is more 
prevalent and the high use of interactive controls is a result of this, thus making it more likely 
that there is, indeed, a negative correlation between power distance and interactive control 
systems. 
With regards to uncertainty avoidance a link cannot be made between Greece and Sweden 
since their measures are the highest and lowest, respectively, of the case countries yet they have 
the same level of local application.  Mexico and Colombia also the same level of local 
application and they have similar levels of uncertainty avoidance, so this may suggest a 
correlation, though it is difficult to see with current data in which direction the correlation 
would travel. 
Masculinity is higher in Mexico and Colombia than in Greece and Sweden, whereas use of 
interactive controls is higher in Greece and Sweden than in Mexico and Colombia. Therefore, 
the data suggests that lower masculinity cultures make greater use of interactive control systems, 
thus a negative correlation.  The difference in masculinity between Greece and Sweden stands 
out, with that of Sweden much lower than that of Greece, yet the data suggests that they both 
make the same use of interactive controls, which could weaken any potential correlation. 
It is worth noting that whilst the local application levels are exactly the same for Greece and 
Sweden at 89, and also for Mexico and Colombia at 67, it is very likely that this is a result of a 
centralised management control style in both companies.  The subsidiaries of company A from 
which we collected data are those in Greece and Sweden, and the subsidiaries of company B 
from which we collected data are those in Mexico and Colombia, and since both case 
companies have highly centralised management control styles it can be presumed that in this 
case the interactive control system levers, as set by the central management, are adhered to 
more strictly on a local level than any of the other controls. This is supported by Van der Stede 
(2003) who states that “significant influences of the parent company on the MCSs observed in 
the business units indicate that the management practices of foreign business units converge 
with those of the parent company”. 
5.2.6 Summary and Discussion of Analysis 
The observations which stand out most from this study are summarised below. 
With regards to the central design of MCS: 
1. National culture in the home country is not a primary factor in setting the MCS for the 
group, this is contingent on many factors, and over time the global MCS will probably 
converge. 
2. The analysis suggests a negative correlation between power distance in the home 
country and diagnostic control system use in the global MCS 
3. The analysis suggests a negative correlation between power distance in the home 
country and interactive control system use in the global MCS 
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With regards to the local adaptation and use of the centrally-set MCS: 
1. For local use of boundary systems, the analysis suggests a positive correlation with 
uncertainty avoidance 
2. For local use of belief systems, the analysis suggests a positive correlation with 
individualism; a negative correlation with power distance; and a negative correlation 
with masculinity 
3. For local use of diagnostic control systems, the analysis suggests a negative correlation 
with power distance; and a negative correlation with masculinity 
4. For interactive control systems, the analysis suggests a negative correlation with power 
distance; and a negative correlation with masculinity 
5. In general, MCS practices in the foreign subsidiaries converges somewhat with the 
central MCS 
 
Van der Stede (2003) states that there are “weak effects of national culture at the business-unit 
level”, which is consistent with our findings because the links identified may be weak, not act as 
expected, or are easily overridden by other factors.  An explanation for this may be that “there 
also may be other business-unit effects beyond national culture, such as size, strategy, past 
performance and degree of functional integration” (O'Connor et al, 2002).  The observations 
we have made concern MCS and large multinational companies which have many factors acting 
upon them, it is thus difficult to isolate the influences of culture whilst controlling for all other 
existing and dynamic factors.  Further adding to this, Chow et al. (1994) argue that “. . . the four 
cultural dimensions operate simultaneously and may create reinforcing or opposing effects on 
an individual's preferences for MCISs”. 
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6 Conclusion 
This study aims to contribute to the literature on how MCS are designed and implemented 
within multinational companies, and to identify whether national-cultural factors affect either 
the design or implementation of them. 
The findings in the analysis and investigation of extant literature identify that national culture is 
not the most important factor in the design of an MCS which is to be used by a multinational 
company in various locations, and that an MCS are likely to converge over time contingent on a 
multitude of factors. 
At the local, or business-unit, level national culture effects are presumed to be weak, 
counterintuitive, or affected by other factors so as to conceal any actual effect that culture may 
have had.  Whilst correlations were identified between certain levers of control and cultural 
aspects, the findings are, at times, inconclusive and further research would be required in order 
to control for the many factors which act upon the MCS in a multinational company. 
With regards to the research questions, we were able to identify how centrally-set MCS are 
designed by the parent company, by the creation of a simple index which allows for 
comparison between different companies.  The question of why the MCS are set in any 
particular way however is inconclusive, since no clear links could be found which would allow a 
general rule to be inductively supposed from the results. 
Our specific findings with regards to the first two research questions, in addition to identifying 
and representing the central design of the MCS, are that national culture in the home country is 
not a primary factor in setting the MCS for the group; however parent companies may conform 
to cultural expectations with regards to power distance which is the most significant cultural 
dimension with regards to the extent to which both diagnostic and interactive controls are used, 
with a negative correlation for both.  We found that no conscious effort is made by either of 
the case companies to tailor MCS by national culture, instead both prefer a centralised MCS 
design. 
We were able to identify how different subsidiaries in in different national cultures implement 
the centrally-set MCS locally, and this was done by creation of a simple index which allows for 
comparison of the implementation between different countries.  With regards to the question 
of why the local implementation is different, the findings are largely inconclusive.  Some 
correlations were identified, however, particularly for the link between power distance and 
interactive control systems, which reinforces the extant literature which also makes this link. 
Our specific findings with regards to the final two research questions are the identification and 
representation of the local application/emphasis on centrally-set MCS.  Furthermore, we found 
that local use of, or emphasis on, boundary systems is likely to have a positive correlation with 
uncertainty avoidance.  Local use of, or emphasis on, belief systems is likely to have a positive 
correlation with individualism; a negative correlation with power distance; and a negative 
correlation with masculinity.  Local use of, or emphasis on, diagnostic control systems is likely 
to have a negative correlation with power distance; and a negative correlation with masculinity.  
Local use of, or emphasis on, interactive control systems is likely to have a negative correlation 
with power distance; and a negative correlation with masculinity. 
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6.1 Contributions to the Research 
This study contributes to the research on management control and how it is affected by cultural 
factors.  It provides a means of clearly representing qualitative data in an index and visual 
format for ease of comparison. 
The study is innovative in that it combines two frameworks, namely Simons’ (1994) levers of 
control, and Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions, as a way to improve the extant literature 
and research methods. With regards to power distance, this paper identifies that for both the 
central and local level, there is a negative correlation between power distance and use of both 
diagnostic and interactive MCS.  Given that there is a lot of literature on the perceived 
importance of Hofstede’s (1980) individualism dimension, and as discussed in section 3.3.1 
(with regards to Triandis 2004; Trompenaars & Woolliams, 2003; Triandis & Suh 2002; Bond, 
Leung, & Wan 1982; Gudykunst et al., 1992), this paper shows that power distance may well, 
in this study at least, be the most significant cultural dimension for central design and local 
adoption of MCS within a multinational organisation.  Thus this paper identifies a research 
opportunity for a lesser-studied aspect which would benefit from further and more detailed 
research. 
6.2 Limitations 
There are limitations regarding case studies in general which are likely to have affected this 
study as it belongs to this specific research area.  To start with, the data collection based on 
semi-structured interviews allows subjective interpretation from two sides.  The interviewees 
can interpret the questions in a different manner from their point of view and put emphasis on 
aspects that are especially relevant from their perspective (Bryman & Bell, 2015).  Thus 
affecting the reliability of the given answers from different respondents.  According to Bryman 
et al. (2011) and their critique on the qualitative research strategy, and since the present study is 
a qualitative one, we can identify relevant critique points which can be perceived as limitations.  
As Bryman, et al. (2011: 413) maintain, the findings of a qualitative research “rely too much on 
the researcher's often unsystematic views about what is significant and important”, a fact which 
contributes to the study being subjective.  Therefore, because of the open and semi-structured 
interviews a distortion could have been provoked into both our view and the information 
obtained from the respondents.  So, despite the fact that we have used a specific theoretical 
framework as guidance for the interviews to be objective, it can still be an implication of 
subjectivity and thus a limitation. 
Furthermore, with regards to the chosen framework for analyses purposes (Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions), we understand that regardless of his work being cited considerably and having had 
a colossal impact on cross-cultural studies and international business research, it has also 
received much criticism (Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 2006; Earley, 2006; Javidan, House, 
Dorfman, Hanges, & Sully de Luque, 2006; Orr, & Hauser, 2008; Smith, 2006).  Triandis 
(1982) for instance has criticised his method of collecting the data as only one measurement 
tool was used and not a multi-method research design.  In addition Chiang (2005) criticises the 
fact that Hofstede generalised his findings as survey results were collected from only one large 
multinational corporation, namely IBM.  Chenhall (2003) argues that cultures change in 
response to globalisation; therefore, the values assigned by Hofstede may not be currently 
applicable to the country.  As globalisation becomes the norm it also carries additional 
elements/variables to be considered as the environmental reporting and control. 
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Because culture is so dissimilar and has various and divergent aspects it is hard to form a 
structure precisely which will equally apply to all countries.  In that sense, Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions should merely be used as a basic guideline to evaluate similarities and differences 
between nations, something we have tried to adhere to in this thesis. 
Apart from the critique points mentioned by Bryman et al. (2011) and Chenhall (2003) we 
propose other limitations to this thesis. 
The sample size for this study was relatively small, which places a limitation upon it.  Only two 
case companies in four countries were studied, and as such many differing national cultures 
were excluded from the study.  A larger sample size would provide better empirical data, from 
which it may be possible to draw more reliable findings and conclusions with a greater 
probability of being true.  The case companies are also from different industries and so it limits 
the possibility to generalise the outcomes, since organisational culture may vary between 
industries, even if other variables are controlled for.  It would, indeed, make for a more reliable 
study to use only one case company in many national cultures, as did Hofstede in his own study 
of IBM. 
During the collection of empirical data, it was difficult to find interviewees who were willing to 
disclose much information about their company’s MCS, and for us to gain sufficient access to 
the case companies.  As such, the information provided by the interviewees would be likely to 
yield more reliable results if greater access and more in-depth information were provided. 
The interviews undertaken during the data collection were subjective in nature and thus subject 
to personal perceptions and prejudices.  Another method of data collection may be devised in 
order to collect more consistent and objective data. 
There is not much extant literature in which specifically addresses the problems set out in the 
paper, and no studies could be found which address links between the levers of control and 
cultural dimensions.  As such there is not much theory upon which to build, and thus the study 
is heavily reliant on analysis of the empirical data, with little theory to assist in its interpretation. 
6.3 Research Opportunities 
We believe that the effect of national culture on MCS is an important and relevant topic, and 
that a thorough understanding of national culture allows a deeper understanding of the 
idiosyncrasies of business practices, norms, and individual behaviour in different locations. 
Future research on the links between various control mechanisms and cultural dimensions will 
contribute nicely to the existing literature.  More specifically, further research into links 
between levers of control and cultural dimensions will allow for a better understanding of this 
topic to be achieved. 
Similar studies to this one, with larger sample sizes would improve the reliability of the findings, 
especially if the samples were taken from similar industries or even the same company in order 
to control for differing organisational culture which may skew results. 
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Appendix 1 – Cultural Dimensions Table (Hofstede, G., 1984) 
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Appendix 2 –Questions from Ferreira and Otley (2009) 
 
The six questions from the framework which are used in this study are addressed below. 
1. Vision and mission 
What is the vision and mission of the organisation and how is this brought to the attention of 
managers and employees? What mechanisms, processes, and networks are used to convey the 
organisation’s overarching purposes and objectives to its members? 
2. Organisation structure 
What is the organisation structure and what impact does it have on the design and use of 
performance management systems (PMSs)? How does it influence and how is it influenced by 
the strategic management process? 
3. Key performance measures 
What are the organisation’s key performance measures deriving from its objectives, key success 
factors, and strategies and plans? How are these specified and communicated and what role do 
they play in performance evaluation? Are there significant omissions? 
4. Target setting 
What level of performance does the organisation need to achieve for each of its key 
performance measures (identified in the above question), how does it go about setting 
appropriate performance targets for them, and how challenging are those performance targets? 
5. Performance evaluation 
What processes, if any, does the organisation follow for evaluating individual, group, and 
organisational performance? Are performance evaluations primarily objective, subjective or 
mixed and how important are formal and informal information and controls in these 
processes? 
6. Reward systems 
What rewards — financial and/or non-financial — will managers and other employees gain by 
achieving performance targets or other assessed aspects of performance(or, conversely, what 
penalties will they suffer by failing to achieve them)? 
